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EU aid for food and nutrition security: Donor coordination and specialization

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Abstract:

As the number of actors involved rises, the world of development assistance is becoming increasingly complicated. In recent years, most donors have therefore recognized the need for more coherent and better coordinated aid efforts to improve aid effectiveness and avoid overlaps and unnecessary duplication of efforts. This paper investigates the coherence and coordination of European Union (EU) development policies aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security. We find that although EU has shown great political commitment towards enhancing the coordination of development policies, progress has been limited. A quantitative assessment of the distribution of EU aid for food and nutrition security for the period between 1995 and 2013, reveals that although the adoption of the Code of Conduct in 2007 appears to have set in motion a downward trend in the dispersion of aid - mostly through increased selectivity in terms of recipient countries – aid proliferation is still rampant. In addition, we find no evidence of improvements in terms of overlap between EU Institutions' and Member States' efforts.

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Introduction

As the number of actors involved rises, the world of development assistance is becoming increasingly complicated. A plethora of donors is now working in the same developing countries and in the same and expanding number of sectors, each pursuing their own policies and strategies. In recent years, most of them have therefore recognized the need for more coherent and better coordinated aid efforts to avoid overlaps and unnecessary duplication of efforts. Moreover, while the necessary quantity of aid has long been subject of scrutiny, increasingly attention is being shifted towards the quality of development assistance or aid effectiveness, which is likely to be influenced by the efficiency and thus the degree of coordination and complementarity of aid activities.

The success of the Marshall Plan and aid programme in Taiwan in the 1950's are for example often attributed to the fact that there was a single, large donor involved. In contrast, the OECD (2011) notes that today *“many developing countries share a common problem: too little aid from too many donors”*. As will become clear throughout this paper, it is often argued that in dealing with a multiplicity of donors with different conditionalities, procedures, languages, reporting guidelines and fiscal years, and projects, recipient countries face several problems including low country ownership, great administrative burdens and increased transaction costs.

This paper aims to shed light on the coherence and coordination of European Union (EU) development policies aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security. Given its specific construction and the fact that both the EU and Member states are active in development cooperation, the EU has shown great political commitment towards enhancing the coordination of development policies. It has been noted however, that there appears to exist *“a wide and persistent gap between the rhetoric of political declarations and the donors' actual aid allocation”* (Aldasoro et al., 2010). Moreover, as the global food price crisis revived interest in food and nutrition security and induced a rapid increase in donor funding for it, the need for improved coordination and complementarity of these particular aid flows increases.

In line with Acharya et al. (2006), Dreher and Michaelowa (2010) we use the term “proliferation” to describe the patterns of donor distribution of aid flows and “fragmentation” to refer to the dispersion in the sources of aid received by recipient countries. While proliferation therefore focuses on the donor perspective, fragmentation describes the situation

from the perspective of an individual aid recipient. One distinct method to reduce aid fragmentation that has been underlined in several EU and international policy documents is concentrating aid efforts by reducing the number of partner countries or sectors in which donors are active. Bigsten (2006) however notes that donors tend to weigh global presence more heavily than aid effectiveness, thus making them reluctant to concentrate on fewer recipients. This paper will quantitatively assess the level of concentration or proliferation of EU Institutions and Member States' aid for food and nutrition security and its evolution over time. In addition we will look at the complementarity of EU and Member State development policies in this area by quantitatively estimating the size of aid for food and nutrition security overlaps.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we provide a review of the academic literature on aid coordination and complementarity as well as an overview of the different international and EU policy efforts aimed at enhancing coordination and complementarity. Next, we focus on aid for food and nutrition security in particular, and discuss the different EU development policies aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security. Finally, we quantitatively assess the degree of proliferation and overlap of EU aid for food and nutrition security.

1. Coordination and complementarity

1.1 A review of the literature

Today, recipients of development assistance interact with a multitude of donors, each with their own projects in a large and increasing number of economic sectors, requiring substantial time and effort by local high level staff and straining recipient country's often weak bureaucracies. Moreover, the ever-growing number of actors involved in development cooperation continues to complicate the coordination process (Nunnenkamp et al., 2013).

The fact that aid is flowing through (too) many channels is commonly argued to give rise to high transaction costs within each recipient country. Other concerns include the lack of critical mass, failure to develop comparative advantages or finding and exploiting a niche and collective action problems such as tragedy of the commons, moral hazard and free rider problems, which tend to undermine the quality of governance or retard the development of public sector capacity (Munro, 2005; Knack and Rahmann, 2007). One example of these collective action problems is that with many donors present, responsibilities become blurred (Dreher and Michaelowa, 2010). Acharya et al. (2006) further add that a diversity of aid channels makes it easier for national-level government officials and politicians to protect their vested interests. Finally, it has been argued that aid proliferation imposes costs on donors as well, since it prevents them from benefitting from economies of scale (Anderson, 2012). Bigsten et al. (2011) estimate for the EU and Member States that reducing the number of partner countries by 37 per cent (one standard deviation) would reduce yearly administrative costs for donors by 20 per cent, or 500 million EUR in 2009 prices. The same estimation for all DAC country donors results in a saving of 856 million USD in 2009 prices (Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015). Shifting from project support towards more (66% of country programmable aid) programme based approaches is estimated to save DAC country donors and the EU another 984 million USD and 300 million EUR in administration costs (Bigsten et al., 2011: Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015).

Several studies however, point to a persistent lack of donor coordination. The emerging evidence on donor herding (e.g. Frot and Santiso, 2011; Davies and Klasen, 2013) - when donors increase their aid effort in line with the efforts of other donors - provides an important indication that donors are not coordinating. In addition, there is substantial evidence documenting high and increasing levels of aid fragmentation and donor proliferation. Based on their calculations of a measure of specialization of aid flows in 2004, Easterly and Pfutze

(2008) conclude that “*the aid effort is splintered among many different donors, each agency's aid effort is splintered among many different countries, and each agency's aid effort is also splintered among many different sectors*”. Frot and Santiso (2010) measure and compare project proliferation in aid sectors in 2007 and find that as a consequence of the major shift towards social sectors, these are the most fragmented. Easterly and Williamson (2011) conclude that donors are very far from efficient behaviour on specialization and that despite several reform efforts fragmentation was still rampant in 2008. Aldasoro et al. (2010) similarly find that there exists a wide gap between the rhetoric of political declarations and the degree of coordination of actual aid flows for the period between 1995 and 2006. Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) measure donor specialization and overlap between 1998 and 2009 and demonstrate that donor proliferation persisted and even increased.

When looking into possible determinants of increased fragmentation, Acharya et al. (2006) demonstrate that between 1999 and 2001 aid recipients experiencing the most extreme fragmentation were very likely to be aided by the worst proliferators among donors. Oh and Kim (2015) confirm these results for a larger sample covering a fifty year period starting from 1960 and additionally demonstrate that donors tend to proliferate as they have more budget. Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) show results that suggest that a rising share of debt relief and general budget support are associated with lower proliferation indices. Using a large panel dataset covering the period from 1961 to 2011, Fuchs et al. (2015) also reveal that export competition between donors is a major impediment to aid coordination.

As mentioned above, it is assumed that the effectiveness of aid is severely hampered by this donor proliferation, aid fragmentation and lack of coordination. Birdsall (2005) even refers to the latter as one of the seven “deadly sins” of aid delivery. Djankov et al. (2009) and Kimura et al. (2012) provide empirical support for the hypothesis that aid proliferation has a negative effect on economic growth in recipient countries, especially in Africa. Munro (2005) however argues for a more nuanced view as “*the relationship between focus and aid effectiveness is almost certainly not simple or linear*”. In line with this argument, Oh and Kim (2015) find that the relationship between aid fragmentation and GDP per capita growth takes on the shape of a concave upward parabola, suggesting that there might exist a threshold after which diseconomies of scale relating to transaction costs outweigh the advantages of pluralism and competition.


Surprisingly few empirical studies investigate the supposed link with increased transaction costs and dysfunctional bureaucratic and political behaviour. The available evidence however

shows support for the hypothesized adverse effects of aid fragmentation. Knack and Rahman (2007) construct indices of aid fragmentation across donors based on annual aid disbursements and the number of aid projects and show that these are associated with deteriorated bureaucratic quality between 1982 and 2001. Djankov et al. (2009) similarly find that fragmentation is associated with increased corruption in the recipient country's government. Anderson (2012) also finds that aid fragmentation tends to raise donors' transaction costs. Finally, the concern that reducing aid fragmentation will give rise to more tying of aid as it could lead to increased monopoly power for donors is negated by the findings presented by Knack and Smets (2013). Their results even indicate that an increase in the donor share of total aid is associated with a decline in the proportion of tied aid.

1.2 EU and global policies aimed at enhancing coordination and complementarity

As mentioned above, donor coordination has received high level political attention, especially in recent years, and the donor community in general, and the European Union in particular, has undertaken several efforts to reduce proliferation and increase coordination (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 : EU and global policies aimed at enhancing coordination and complementarity - Timeline



Given its specific construction and the fact that both the EU and Member states are active in development cooperation, the European Union has paid considerable attention to the coordination of development policies. Already in a Memorandum from 1972 for example, the Commission recognized the crucial importance of coherence and coordination for the effectiveness of aid and issued guidelines aimed at strengthening coordination between national and Community policies (EC, 1972). While in the following years several other

proposals were made, including “*concerted action at sectoral level*” and “*coordination of operations in connection with specific projects and programmes*”, these did not translate into concrete steps (Delputte, 2013). The ***Treaty of Maastricht (1992)***, provided a legal basis for development policy and established the principles of coordination and complementarity. Hoebink (2004) however notes that “*because there were much more important issues at stake, because the negotiating process was long and hard on most of these issues, the three C’s (coordination, complementarity and coherence) slipped more or less unattended into the final text of the Treaty of Maastricht*”. Moreover, the text is cast in rather general terms.

After the 2002 Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, aid effectiveness came to the forefront of the policy debate and the ***Monterrey Consensus*** includes a clear commitment towards improving the coordination of aid (UN, 2003). In the 2003 ***Rome Declaration on Harmonization***, members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) again expressed their concern about unproductive transaction costs and agreed to facilitate harmonization (OECD/DAC, 2003). Perhaps the most important milestone in this political quest for more aid effectiveness and improved coordination however, was reached in 2005 with the ***Paris Declaration*** (2005). Amongst other things, the latter serves as an explicit agreement between donor and recipient countries to improve coordination. The declaration clearly states that “*excessive fragmentation of aid at global, country or sector level impairs aid effectiveness*” and calls for “*a pragmatic approach to the division of labour and burden sharing*” to increase complementarity and reduce transaction costs. While donors are urged to specialise in areas where they have a comparative advantage, within the Paris Declaration’s call for harmonization and coordination, the focus lies more on the harmonization of rules and procedures, the development of new instruments to pool resources, and increased shared analysis, rather than increased specialization and clear division of labour.

Though generally overlooked, it is important to acknowledge the decisive contribution of the EU (Carbone, 2012). The Paris Declaration, and in particular the sections on donor coordination, largely reflected the EU’s common position that was based on a series of practical recommendations issued in 2004. With the adoption of the ***European Consensus on Development*** that same year, the EU further underlined its dedication to enhancing aid effectiveness by improving coordination and complementarity by committing to taking a lead role in implementing the Paris Declaration and making four additional commitments; to provide all capacity building assistance through coordinated programmes with an increasing use of multi-donors arrangements; to channel 50 % of government-to-government assistance

through country systems, including by increasing the percentage of our assistance provided through budget support or sector-wide approaches; to avoid the establishment of any new project implementation units; to reduce the number of un-coordinated missions by 50 %. As a follow-up, the EU adopted a ***Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*** in 2007. With principles that include focussing on a limited number of priority countries and a maximum of three sectors in each partner country in line with donors' comparative advantages, the code of Conduct is considered as “*the most demanding normative framework on Division of Labour so far*” (Burcky, 2011). In the run-up to the forum on aid effectiveness in Accra in 2008, the EU also launched the ***Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour and Complementarity*** (FTI DoL), supporting a selected number of developing countries in the process of implementing in-country division of labour.

The impact of the EU was in turn evident in the ***Accra Agenda for Action*** (2008). In particular, the Agenda aims to achieve reduced aid fragmentation by “*improving the complementarity of donors' efforts and the division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within countries, and across countries*”. The ***International Good Practice Principles for Country-Led Division of Labour and Complementarity*** were finalised the following year, and again largely reflected the principles adopted by the EU earlier (Carbone, 2012) as they underline the importance of partner country leadership in guiding donors towards focussing their support on a limited number of sectors or areas in which they can deliver high quality aid (OECD, 2009).

Despite this strong political commitment to improving aid effectiveness through enhancing coordination and focussing on complementarity, the 2011 report monitoring the implementation of the Paris Declaration concludes that there was limited progress with regard to the use of programme-based approaches and the coordination of donor missions and analytic works and the implementation of division of labour exercises at the country level has been relatively slow. The report further indicates that most efforts by donors to reduce the burden of aid management for partner countries have not had a significant impact (OECD, 2012). The third FTI DoL Monitoring Survey however argues that there have been improvements since 2008 and encouraging results in some important areas, including the widespread use and institutionalization of donor mappings, an upward trend in country-level agreement on sector definitions and solid use of lead donor arrangements (Wentzel et al., 2011).

2. EU development policy aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security

In the aftermath of the global food price crisis, the European Union and its Member States underlined the importance of combatting hunger and aimed to materialize their leadership in the global food security agenda, by endorsing *An EU policy framework to assist developing countries in addressing food security challenges*² (COM(2010) 127).

The framework urges the EU to focus on those food insecure countries that are most off-track in reaching MDG1 - in particular in Africa, but also South Asia and countries in fragile situations - and concentrate on smallholder farmers and vulnerable communities. The framework is based on four pillars:

- i. increasing availability of food (through sustainable small-scale food production);
- ii. improving access to food (by applying a "Right-to-Food" approach and enhancing employment opportunities and social transfer mechanisms);
- iii. improving nutritional adequacy of food intake;
- iv. enhancing crisis prevention and management in developing countries.

More specifically the EU and its Member States committed to prioritize smallholder agricultural development, governance, regional integration, and assistance mechanisms for vulnerable populations.

To maximize the effectiveness of these interventions, the policy framework stresses the importance of alignment with national and regional policies on agriculture and food security. The framework further specifically states that the EU approach to food security in developing countries needs to be anchored in the principles of the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda and the EU DoL. In particular, the EU and its Member States should identify regions and countries where tasks will be divided based on comparative advantage and coordinate actions under the guidance of a lead donor.

Recurrent crises in the Sahel region and in the Horn of Africa inspired the Commission's proposal for *The EU approach to resilience: Learning from food security crises* (COM (2012) 586 final). This communication underlines the need to work on a long-term and systematic approach to building resilience and focuses on tackling the root causes of food

² This communication was complemented by a communication on humanitarian food assistance, which focuses on emergency and post-emergency context and therefore falls outside the scope of this paper.

insecurity rather than addressing the consequences. The document clearly states that enhancing resilience requires “*alleviating the underlying causes conducive to crises as well as enhancing capacities to better manage future uncertainty and change*”. The three components to the approach are:

- i. anticipating crises by assessing risk;
- ii. focusing on prevention and preparedness;
- iii. enhancing the response to crisis.

Moreover, in line with the emerging consensus on the importance of nutrition, the term “food and nutrition security” replaced food security and the policy framework was complemented with a specific nutrition policy framework ***Enhancing maternal and child nutrition in external assistance*** (COM(2013) 141 final). The EU promotes a multi-sector approach to address the various determinants of undernutrition combining sustainable agriculture, rural development, food and nutrition security, public health, water and sanitation, social protection and education. The Commission identified the following strategic priorities:

- i. enhance mobilization and political commitment for nutrition (through political dialogue and advocacy at the country level and working towards greater harmonization and coherence and a more effective international response);
- ii. scale up actions at country level (by strengthening human and institutional/system capacity; increasing interventions specifically designed for nutrition in humanitarian and development settings and increasing nutrition-sensitive actions in humanitarian and development settings);
- iii. strengthening the expertise and the knowledge base for nutrition (through investing in applied research and support information systems and providing technical expertise and assistance).

To reinforce and operationalize the EU commitments an implementation plan ***Boosting food and nutrition security through EU action: Implementing our commitments*** (SWD (2013) 104 final) followed in 2013. As the first draft already saw light in 2011, the formulation of this implementation plan proved to be a cumbersome process. Possible reasons for this unusual delay include a number of policy shifts including the focus on nutrition and a lack of political drive from the Member States (Engel et al., 2013). The implementation plan defines six policy priorities that are accompanied by specific performance criteria and indicative intervention areas:

- i. improving smallholder resilience and rural livelihoods;
- ii. supporting effective governance;
- iii. supporting regional agriculture and food and nutrition security policies;
- iv. strengthening social protection mechanisms for food and nutrition security, particularly for vulnerable population groups;
- v. enhancing nutrition in particular for mothers, infants and children; and
- vi. enhancing coordination between development and humanitarian actors to build resilience and promote sustainable food and nutrition security.

It is interesting to note however, that the main performance criteria consist of the number and value of relevant programmes rather than actual food and nutrition security outcomes.

3. Measuring EU aid for food and nutrition security coordination and complementarity

We will base our analysis of coordination and complementarity of EU aid for food and nutrition security on data on aid activities derived from the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS). For the purpose of this paper, we define aid for food and nutrition security in a broad sense and distinguish it from humanitarian or emergency food assistance. Extending the OECD (2012) definition of aid for food and nutrition security and in line with the working definition of aid for FNS used by the G8 L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI, 2012), we consider all aid reported under *agriculture, agro-industries, fishing, basic nutrition*³, *basic drinking water supply*⁴ and *sanitation*⁵, *rural development* and *developmental food aid/food security assistance*.

We will largely focus our discussion on commitments, as these are available for a longer time period and Mürle (2007), Dreher and Michaelowa (2010) and Aldasoro et al. (2010) underline that these data are better suited for a forward-looking analysis as they are closer to current policies. Results of calculations based on data on disbursements are reported in Appendix A. To account for the fact that aid allocations exhibit large year-to-year fluctuations, our main analysis is based on average commitments over the sub-periods 1995-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005, 2006-2009 and 2010-2013. Results of calculations based on yearly data can be found in Appendix B.

3.1 Fragmentation and proliferation

Based on data on disbursements, as these are more appropriate for assessing the current situation rather than to plan future activities (Dreher and Michaelowa, 2013), we take a first glance at the dispersion of aid for food and nutrition security in 2013. The EU institutions disbursed aid for food and nutrition security to no less than 116 developing countries in 2013.


³ “Basic nutrition” covers direct feeding programmes, determination of micro-nutrient deficiencies, provision of vitamin A, iodine, iron etc., monitoring of nutritional status, nutrition and food hygiene education, household food security.

⁴ “Basic drinking water supply” covers rural water supply schemes using hand pumps, spring catchments, gravity-fed systems, rainwater collection and fog harvesting, storage tanks, small distribution systems typically with shared connections/points of use and urban schemes using hand pumps and local neighbourhood networks including those with shared connections.

⁵ “Basic sanitation” covers latrines, on-site disposal and alternative sanitation systems, including the promotion of household and community investments in the construction of these facilities.

Germany and France in turn are reported to have been involved in 96 and 79 countries respectively and more than 65 per cent of recipient countries of EU aid for food and nutrition security were dealing with at least 5 EU donors in this area alone. In the first Biennial Report on Implementing EU Food and Nutrition Security Policy Commitments, the Commission notes that “*there may be opportunities for EU donors to operate more efficiently*”, as according to their calculations 68 partner countries received less than EUR 3 million on average per donor, with the problem being particularly striking in Central America (EC, 2014). The latter can be derived from Figure 2, depicting the total amount of EU development assistance for food and nutrition security received and the corresponding number of EU donors (Member States and Institutions) for all recipient countries in 2013. From the map we can immediately see that in many cases the large number of EU donors cannot solely be explained by larger total receipts of aid for food and nutrition security. Take for example South Africa, which is by no means an important recipient of aid for food and nutrition security in terms of total volume, yet the country received assistance from 12 different EU donors in 2013.

Figure 2: Mapping the dispersion of EU ODA for FNS in 2013



Source : OECD/DAC CRS (2015)


While easily calculated and interpreted, the simple count of donors and recipients does not take into account important aspects of aid dispersion including cross-sector proliferation. In what follows we will therefore base our discussion on a more detailed and comprehensive measure of aid proliferation. In particular, we will follow the methodology developed by Aldasoro et al. (2010) and Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) and calculate a Theil index of concentration that captures both the recipient country and sector dimension:

$$(1) \quad P = - \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{s=1}^m (aid_{i,s} * \ln(aid_{i,s}))$$

Where $aid_{i,s}$ stands for share of aid in sector s to recipient i and n and m stand for the total number of recipient countries and sectors respectively.

This proliferation index will range from $\ln(1)$ or zero, which corresponds to the case where all aid goes to one sector in one particular country, to $\ln(n*m)$, when aid for food and nutrition security is distributed evenly among m ($=7$) different sectors and n ($=180$) recipients.

Figure 3: Concentration index EU ODA for FNS (commitments)



Source : Author's calculations

The Theil indices of proliferation across both sectors and recipients for the four year averages of aid for food and nutrition security are reported in Columns (I) of Table 1 and depicted in Figure 3. On average for the entire period (1995-2013), Germany stands out as the worst proliferator, followed by Belgium and France. The case of Belgium is particularly striking, as the country's total aid for food security budget is rather modest. For the period between 2009 and 2013, France is the worst proliferator as Germany appears to have increased its focus considerably.

Although modest improvements have been made in recent years, the European Commission itself is far from concentrated in its provision of aid for food and nutrition security. Of course this has to be nuanced, given the fact that the total aid budget is considerably larger compared to any of the Member States since throughout this period over one third of total EU aid for food and nutrition security was channelled through EU Institutions.

In general, the average level of proliferation among the traditional EU bilateral donors has been declining for the last two periods. Looking at the yearly data, we note that proliferation was largely increasing from 1996 up until 2007, after which modest improvements have been made. In 2013 however, there appears to have been an upsurge for most Member States. At the same time, EU enlargement has prompted the establishment of several new donors, who are still expanding their portfolios and therefore increasingly proliferating.

Table 1 allows us to further decompose these results and assess how the country and sector dimensions contribute to overall aid proliferation, as the concentration index based on total aid for food security informs us on the recipient country dimension (columns II), while the index based on sector-specific aid for food and nutrition security to all developing countries describes cross-sector proliferation (columns III). It is important to note that the two sub-indices should not be compared directly as they have different maximum values, corresponding to the logarithm of the total number of sectors (7) and recipient countries (180) respectively.

Table 1: Concentration Index^a ODA for FNS Commitments

	1995-1997			1998-2001			2002-2005			2006-2009			2010-2013		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
Austria	1.46	2.99	1.28	3.03	2.91	1.32	3.57	3.00	1.30	3.54	2.95	1.32	3.37	3.05	0.97
Belgium	3.64	3.82	0.99	3.53	3.67	1.22	4.30	3.53	1.18	3.92	3.27	1.15	3.30	3.14	0.90
Czech Rep.													1.79	2.24	0.67
Denmark	2.93	2.80	1.21	3.07	2.71	0.84	3.34	2.90	1.20	2.81	2.42	1.48	2.51	2.77	0.85
Estonia													0.36	0.05	0.00
Finland	1.79	2.06	1.10	3.03	2.45	1.30	2.89	2.43	1.15	2.98	2.68	1.20	2.68	3.00	1.24
France	3.09	3.18	1.32	3.79	3.27	0.79	4.01	3.58	1.20	4.03	3.60	0.77	3.60	3.49	1.13
Germany	2.76	3.28	1.26	4.11	3.82	1.31	4.77	4.02	1.29	4.57	3.86	1.35	3.15	3.71	1.36
Greece							3.41	2.91	1.18	3.11	2.73	1.39	1.34	1.50	0.15
Ireland				1.83	2.61	1.19	3.96	2.96	1.39	3.38	2.84	1.39	2.74	2.78	1.31
Italy	1.83	3.19	1.06	1.91	3.68	1.06	4.21	3.75	1.52	4.20	3.73	1.20	3.54	3.43	1.23
Luxembourg				0.57	0.96	0.43	2.64	2.42	1.24	3.71	3.05	1.58	2.50	2.83	1.48
Netherlands	2.55	3.40	1.34	4.29	3.73	1.49	3.59	2.99	1.21	3.57	3.09	1.20	2.43	2.67	1.24
Poland													0.60	1.75	0.95
Portugal	0.51	0.43	0.43	2.10	1.71	0.54	2.16	1.60	0.58	2.08	1.43	0.78	2.18	1.79	1.20
Slovak Rep.													0.64	1.17	0.50
Slovenia													1.14	1.53	1.00
Spain	1.93	2.01	1.62	3.95	3.37	1.59	4.52	3.39	1.60	4.58	3.60	1.65	3.09	3.48	1.36
Sweden	1.98	2.24	1.16	3.39	2.90	1.32	3.08	2.84	1.26	3.29	3.00	1.14	2.69	2.65	1.03
UK	2.86	3.22	1.32	3.59	2.92	1.46	3.71	3.13	1.32	2.89	2.46	1.38	2.53	3.08	1.54
EU Inst.	1.10	3.91	1.14	2.42	3.91	1.24	4.48	4.05	1.44	4.40	4.00	1.26	3.58	3.71	1.31

^a See text for details of calculation.

Columns (I): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (II): based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (III): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries.

It appears that most progress has been made in terms of selectivity in choosing recipient countries. On average, the index for cross-country proliferation has been declining largely since 2005. It is interesting that we find rather different results across both dimensions for some donors. Belgium for example is one of the worst proliferators in terms of recipient countries, while the country has been rather focused in terms of sectors. Ireland on the

contrary, appears to make up for what it lacks in sector focus by its selectivity in terms of recipient countries.

3.2 Overlap

It can be argued that while perhaps a necessary condition, specialization or concentration of aid does not guarantee better coordination as donors could favour the same (smaller number of) countries and sectors giving rise to overlapping activities. Moreover, given the importance of the concept of “complementarity” in EU policy on development cooperation, we are in particular interested in measuring the coordination between the EU and Member States. Consider Germany, a donor disbursing aid for food and nutrition security to 86 of the same developing countries that the EU Institutions were aiding. Moreover, in 83 cases, both donors were active in the same sector(s) as well. Though, this doesn’t necessarily imply that German and EU Institutions’ development assistance for food and nutrition security is uncomplimentary, it at least suggests that there might be some overlap.

To get a more detailed, quantitative sense of the overlap between EU Institutions and Member States development policies aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security, we compare the structure of their aid. In the spirit of the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy, which focuses both on cross-country and cross-sector complementarity, and in line with Aldasoro et al. (2010) and Nunnenkamp et al. (2013), we will again consider both the recipient country and sector dimension to allow for the possibility that coordination may take the form of the Member States engaging in a different sub-set of countries or alternatively focusing on different sectors.

$$(2) \quad OV^{d1,d2} = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{s=1}^m \text{Min} (aid_{i,s}^{d1} ; aid_{i,s}^{d2})$$


With $aid_{i,s}^{dj}$ = share of aid from donor j in sector s to recipient i and n and m stand for the total number of recipient countries and sectors respectively.

This index varies from 0, in the case of no overlap between donors to 1 when the composition of the aid budget is completely the same.

Figure 4 and columns I of Table 2 show the overlaps between the 4 year average commitments of aid for food and nutrition security from the different Member States and the EU Institutions respectively. Similar to what we found with regards to proliferation, on average for the entire period, Germany appears to have most overlapping aid activities with the EU Institutions and is closely followed by France. For both countries, the similarities with the EU Institutions composition of aid for food and nutrition security were particularly large

before 2005 and have declined modestly afterwards. Overall, we find that overlap between the average EU and the majority Member States commitments of aid for food and nutrition security has decreased for the period between 2010 and 2013. For Denmark however, there was a sharp increase and of course overlap between the EU and the emerging donors from the New Member States has been rising as well. In addition, when looking at the yearly estimates there is no real discernible downward sloping trend. We find that overlap with the EU Institutions in fact peaked in the aftermath of the global food price crisis and has been on the rise again since 2012. This seems to suggest that increasing policy attention and funding for food and nutrition security goes hand in hand with more overlapping aid activities and therefore perhaps the duplication of efforts.

Figure 4: Overlap index EU ODA for FNS (commitments)



Source : Author's calculations

Columns II and III in Table 2 present overlap indices for the distribution of aid for food and nutrition security along the dimension of recipient countries and sectors respectively. We again note that the two sub-indices should not be compared directly as the likelihood of having a similar distribution across 7 sectors is considerably higher compared to 180 recipient countries.

Table 2: Overlap Index^a ODA for FNS Commitments

	1995-1997			1998-2001			2002-2005			2006-2009			2010-2013		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
Austria	0.03	0.09	0.57	0.08	0.09	0.53	0.08	0.16	0.59	0.13	0.14	0.56	0.11	0.16	0.81
Belgium	0.09	0.24	0.40	0.14	0.14	0.51	0.13	0.23	0.57	0.14	0.13	0.74	0.14	0.14	0.76
Czech Rep.													0.05	0.04	0.71
Denmark	0.05	0.08	0.31	0.05	0.05	0.29	0.07	0.15	0.43	0.09	0.10	0.65	0.15	0.17	0.79
Estonia													0.01	0.00	0.54
Finland	0.03	0.04	0.46	0.10	0.06	0.46	0.08	0.09	0.52	0.07	0.06	0.55	0.11	0.12	0.83
France	0.07	0.19	0.44	0.14	0.13	0.43	0.22	0.19	0.59	0.18	0.18	0.73	0.17	0.17	0.85
Germany	0.06	0.16	0.48	0.18	0.18	0.49	0.19	0.23	0.57	0.19	0.14	0.72	0.19	0.19	0.87
Greece							0.09	0.10	0.52	0.12	0.10	0.72	0.02	0.01	0.57
Ireland				0.04	0.11	0.46	0.19	0.17	0.61	0.16	0.13	0.80	0.15	0.13	0.82

Italy	0.03	0.16	0.74	0.06	0.16	0.85	0.16	0.16	0.69	0.19	0.14	0.95	0.18	0.15	0.89
Luxembourg				0.01	0.01	0.32	0.09	0.16	0.63	0.11	0.15	0.62	0.07	0.25	0.77
Netherlands	0.06	0.15	0.49	0.15	0.17	0.48	0.12	0.15	0.52	0.17	0.12	0.55	0.11	0.08	0.87
Poland													0.03	0.03	0.82
Portugal	0.00	0.00	0.23	0.01	0.02	0.29	0.03	0.05	0.36	0.02	0.03	0.71	0.02	0.06	0.70
Slovak Rep.													0.03	0.04	0.72
Slovenia													0.04	0.02	0.54
Spain	0.02	0.06	0.36	0.13	0.09	0.53	0.12	0.11	0.64	0.12	0.12	0.60	0.12	0.12	0.94
Sweden	0.04	0.13	0.45	0.08	0.11	0.44	0.06	0.08	0.58	0.12	0.10	0.77	0.10	0.14	0.79
UK	0.07	0.19	0.48	0.10	0.14	0.48	0.22	0.22	0.70	0.12	0.10	0.56	0.12	0.13	0.74

^a See text for details of calculation.

Columns (I): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (II): based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (III): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries.

We find that on average for the entire period, Germany, Belgium and France appear to have most overlap with the EU Institutions in terms of recipient countries. This is not surprising, given the fact that these three donors are amongst the worst cross-country proliferators, which increases the likelihood of overlapping activities as the EU itself is far from selective in choosing recipient countries as well. Belgium however, appears to have reduced its cross-country overlap with EU Institutions considerably, even though its selectivity in terms of recipient countries has remained limited. This could imply that Belgium and the EU are both focusing on a large but increasingly different subset of countries, thus contributing to coordination to some extent. Improved coordination in this case however, is unlikely to alleviate recipient countries' problems associated with aid fragmentation. The yearly data further reveal that overlap with Luxembourg seems to be experiencing a strong upward trend when focussing on the recipient dimension only. The country actually has the largest cross-country overlap with the EU for the period between 2010 and 2013, even though their total budget for aid for food and nutrition security remains limited. Overall, there is no real consistent pattern of changes in cross-country overlap over time. While overlap decreased for several Member States in the period between 2006 and 2009, this decline persisted into the next period for Italy and the Netherlands only.

Interestingly, we get a somewhat different picture when focussing on cross-sector overlap. Although modest improvements have been made recently, Italy stands out with a very high degree of overlap with the EU for the entire period. Moreover, there actually appears to be a strong upward trend in the similarities between EU and Member States sectoral composition of aid for food and nutrition security, especially after the global food price crisis. Similar to what we found for proliferation, improvement in overlap between the EU and Member States

most likely stem from changes in terms of focussing on a different or complimentary subset of recipient countries rather than sectors.

4. Conclusion

The global food price crisis renewed interest in food and nutrition security and generated a significant increase in donor funding for it. In this context, the need for improved coordination and complementarity of funding is high as it is widely assumed that the effectiveness of aid is severely hampered by donor proliferation, aid fragmentation and lack of coordination. This paper investigates the coherence and coordination of European Union (EU) development policies aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security. We find that the EU has shown great political commitment towards enhancing the coordination of development policies. The in 2007 adopted Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in particular is considered as “*the most demanding normative framework on Division of Labour so far*” (Burcky, 2011). In addition, the EU Policy Framework to assist developing countries in addressing food security challenges specifically refers to this Code of Conduct and clearly specifies that tasks should be divided based on comparative advantage and actions should be coordinated.

When quantitatively assessing whether EU aid for food and nutrition security has become less proliferated over time -by concentrating in selected recipient countries and/or by specialising in selected aid sectors- however, we find that progress has been limited. In addition, the enlargement of the EU has prompted the establishment of several new donors, who are still expanding their portfolios and therefore increasingly proliferating. This seems to suggest that though the adoption of the Code of Conduct in 2007 appears to have set in motion a downward trend the proliferation of aid for food and nutrition security, the implementation has been relatively slow. Our results further indicate that most progress in terms of selectivity has been made through a reduction in the number of recipient countries rather than sectors.

Even less favourable conclusions emerge from our analysis of the overlap between EU Institutions’ and Member States’ aid activities. Overall, we find no evidence of a clear downward sloping trend. On the contrary, it appears that overlap with the EU Institutions in fact peaked in the aftermath of the global food price crisis and has been on the rise again since

2012, especially in terms of the sectoral composition of the aid budget, giving rise to the idea that the increasing attention and funding for food and nutrition security goes hand in hand with more overlapping aid activities and therefore perhaps the duplication of efforts. However, more in-depth research on the latter is advisable.

In sum, while political commitment to improving the coordination and complementarity of aid in general and aid for food and nutrition security in particular appears to be strong, our quantitative analysis reveals that in reality progress has limited and slow and there is still significant room for improvement.

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Appendix A: Disbursements

Table A1: Concentration Index^a ODA for FNS Disbursements

	2002-2005			2006-2009			2010-2013		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
Austria	3.57	2.93	1.26	3.43	2.87	1.30	3.13	2.94	1.12
Belgium	4.37	3.62	1.20	4.11	3.41	1.11	3.13	3.19	1.07
Czech Republic							1.80	2.24	0.66
Denmark	2.62	2.73	1.17	3.23	2.62	1.34	2.80	2.96	1.14
Estonia							0.37	0.15	0.00
Finland	1.86	2.58	1.21	2.93	2.57	1.12	2.43	2.84	1.17
France	4.18	3.61	1.01	4.17	3.59	0.93	3.45	3.42	0.99
Germany	4.89	4.05	1.33	4.65	3.94	1.41	3.41	3.77	1.35
Greece	3.41	2.91	1.18	3.11	2.74	1.39	1.34	1.51	0.15
Ireland	3.96	3.04	1.39	3.38	2.90	1.39	2.74	2.80	1.31
Italy	4.38	3.92	1.29	4.57	3.98	1.45	3.92	3.74	1.43
Luxembourg	2.57	2.80	1.46	3.71	3.05	1.58	2.50	2.83	1.48
Netherlands	3.80	3.17	1.36	3.70	3.18	1.26	2.52	2.90	1.23
Poland							0.60	1.75	0.95
Portugal	2.16	1.60	0.58	2.08	1.43	0.78	2.18	1.79	1.21
Slovak Republic							0.61	1.06	0.67
Slovenia							1.23	1.54	1.07
Spain	4.64	3.44	1.61	4.61	3.60	1.63	3.42	3.59	1.32
Sweden	3.35	2.91	1.27	3.48	3.08	1.28	3.05	3.04	1.24
United Kingdom	3.85	3.00	1.54	3.27	2.70	1.50	2.23	2.79	1.58
EU Institutions	4.30	3.74	1.44	4.80	4.18	1.44	4.16	4.21	1.52

^a See text for details of calculation. Columns (I): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (II): based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (III): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries.

Table A2: Overlap Index^a ODA for FNS Disbursements

	2002-2005			2006-2009			2010-2013		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
Austria	0.13	0.29	0.60	0.17	0.31	0.67	0.13	0.25	0.70
Belgium	0.25	0.41	0.71	0.21	0.37	0.64	0.18	0.38	0.72
Czech Republic							0.06	0.16	0.58
Denmark	0.09	0.20	0.52	0.14	0.29	0.59	0.18	0.39	0.73
Estonia							0.01	0.01	0.41
Finland	0.04	0.18	0.64	0.11	0.31	0.53	0.09	0.26	0.71
France	0.25	0.46	0.67	0.23	0.36	0.61	0.23	0.41	0.70
Germany	0.25	0.41	0.70	0.25	0.49	0.72	0.26	0.51	0.81
Greece	0.07	0.17	0.62	0.11	0.19	0.67	0.02	0.08	0.45
Ireland	0.14	0.27	0.71	0.20	0.38	0.73	0.19	0.32	0.82
Italy	0.15	0.33	0.78	0.29	0.47	0.93	0.25	0.47	0.82
Luxembourg	0.14	0.35	0.78	0.13	0.25	0.70	0.14	0.28	0.72
Netherlands	0.14	0.26	0.68	0.20	0.37	0.63	0.16	0.33	0.74
Poland							0.02	0.07	0.67
Portugal	0.06	0.09	0.51	0.04	0.07	0.60	0.03	0.06	0.66
Slovak Republic							0.03	0.09	0.50
Slovenia							0.04	0.16	0.51
Spain	0.15	0.27	0.77	0.23	0.37	0.64	0.17	0.36	0.78
Sweden	0.06	0.17	0.70	0.19	0.34	0.68	0.17	0.34	0.74
United Kingdom	0.12	0.21	0.86	0.21	0.39	0.72	0.18	0.35	0.78

^a See text for details of calculation. Columns (I): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (II): based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries; Columns (III): based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries.

Appendix B: Yearly changes

Table B1: Concentration Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Commitments

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria		3.33	2.76	2.96	2.69	2.97	3.11	3.04	2.85	2.95	3.04	2.69	3.35	2.49	2.78	3.36	2.79	2.57	3.15
Belgium	4.11	3.85	4.15	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.82	3.99	4.17	3.66	3.71	3.85	3.55	3.46	3.61	3.59	3.37	3.73	3.18
Czech Republic																	2.42	2.49	2.55
Denmark	2.82	2.55	1.98	2.08	1.48	2.19	2.52	1.61	2.12	2.55	2.29	1.67	1.46	0.98	2.04	2.37	2.43	1.94	1.71
Estonia																			0.05
Finland	1.66	1.76	1.81	2.12	1.95	1.84	2.57	1.43	1.91	2.08	2.21	2.28	2.11	2.28	2.71	2.37	2.63	2.82	3.09
France	3.04	2.85	3.29	2.94	3.11	3.31	3.27	3.84	3.4	3.63	2.71	3.37	3.54	3.66	3.48	3.57	3.46	3.65	3.35
Germany	3.02	2.92	3.4	3.14	4.05	4.15	4	4.13	4.18	3.98	4.19	3.6	4.32	4.03	4.11	3.82	3.93	3.67	3.9
Greece								2.25	2.52	2.95	2.71	2.17	1.62	3.07	2.27	1.22	0	0	
Ireland						3.2	3.16	3.5	3.67	3.51	3.7	3.45	3.33	3.4	3.54	3.24	3.41	3.37	3.22
Italy	2.84	3.15	2.36	3.35	3.81	3.42	3.68	3.5	3.57	3.27	2.76	3.7	3.85	3.96	2.61	3.96	2.6	2.72	3.33
Luxembourg							0.96	0.76	1.1	2.57	2.66	3.43	3.63	3.34	3.31	3.03	3.32	3.16	3.14
Netherlands	3.57	3.77	3.14	4.01	3.6	3.14	3.48	3.25	2.57	2.49	2.62	2.87	2.69	2.69	2.71	2.48	2.28	2.89	2.89
Poland																			2.19
Portugal		0.43	0	0.64	1.91	1.56	1.27	1.75	2.02	2	1.97	1.53	2.02	1.85	1.97	2.35	2.34	2.3	2.46
Slovak Republic																			1.21
Slovenia																1.62	1.42	0.55	0.88
Spain	0	0.43	3.27	4.01	4.22	3.19	3.92	4.07	3.71	4.32	4.43	4.69	4.6	4.72	3.72	4.37	4.25	4.2	3.36
Sweden	1.93	1.31	2.42	2.32	1.85	2.29	2.75	2.06	1.92	1.57	2.8	2.28	2.4	2.67	2.77	2.76	1.79	1.59	2.53
United Kingdom	3.3	2.87	3.04	3.18	2.56	3.26	3.04	2.57	3.18	2.76	2.85	2.28	2.47	2.19	2.33	2.14	3.02	2.92	3.36
EU	3.78	3.88	3.54	3.81	3.8	3.88	3.94	3.66	3.82	3.6	3.77	3.72	3.79	3.33	3.74	3.21	2.88	3.9	3.93

^a See text for details of calculation.

¹ Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries.

Table B2: Concentration Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Commitments (recipient only)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria		2.87	2.63	2.52	2.39	2.55	2.65	2.71	2.43	2.75	2.67	2.41	2.95	2.22	2.53	2.91	2.53	2.34	2.74
Belgium	3.72	3.4	3.66	3.64	3.49	3.59	3.24	3.46	3.5	3.11	3.17	3.24	3.07	2.86	3.09	3.12	2.87	3.15	2.72
Czech Republic																	2.08	2.14	1.14
Denmark	2.58	2.14	1.87	2	1.46	2.07	2.32	1.51	1.73	2.21	2.23	1.26	1.32	0.97	1.99	2.16	2.26	1.83	1.43
Estonia																			0.52
Finland	1.46	1.76	1.61	1.85	1.74	1.44	2.23	1.36	1.62	2.01	2.09	2.11	1.86	2.17	2.41	2.11	2.36	2.64	2.75
France	2.68	2.55	2.88	2.63	2.8	2.99	3.04	3.54	3.19	3.32	2.65	3.03	3.37	3.37	3.12	3.17	2.97	3.12	3.08
Germany	2.66	2.82	3.19	2.9	3.43	3.62	3.58	3.66	3.66	3.53	3.71	3.23	3.79	3.45	3.59	3.44	3.36	3.21	3.35
Greece								2.25	2.15	2.6	2.55	1.66	1.51	2.87	2.27	1.22	0	0	
Ireland						2.49	2.53	2.81	2.93	2.77	2.9	2.81	2.62	2.68	2.89	2.62	2.81	2.74	2.64
Italy	2.78	2.94	2.18	3.25	3.42	3.11	3.42	3.21	3.29	3.1	2.66	3.45	3.4	3.57	2.38	3.45	2.37	2.44	3.16
Luxembourg							0.96	0.76	1.1	2.51	2.4	2.87	2.93	2.74	2.88	2.61	2.75	2.63	2.59
Netherlands	3.19	3.24	2.86	3.41	3.2	2.79	3.07	2.82	2.19	2.36	2.48	2.67	2.43	2.4	2.39	2.2	1.82	2.39	2.34
Poland																			1.75
Portugal		0.43	0	0.64	1.23	1.38	1.09	1.37	1.75	1.43	1.57	1.35	1.39	1.37	1.43	1.69	1.58	1.72	1.85
Slovak Republic																			1.17
Slovenia																1.56	1.25	0.53	0.88
Spain	0	0.43	2.59	3.17	3.22	2.53	3.1	3.15	2.99	3.28	3.36	3.5	3.55	3.53	3.03	3.44	3.43	3.36	2.82
Sweden	1.81	0.93	1.88	2.1	1.65	1.85	2.64	2.01	1.83	1.57	2.73	2.21	2.22	2.57	2.56	2.41	1.76	1.17	2.38
United Kingdom	2.97	2.53	2.64	2.69	2.11	2.5	2.77	2.41	2.88	2.5	2.58	2.11	2.05	1.95	2.01	2	2.67	2.63	2.82
EU	3.43	3.66	3.47	3.51	3.52	3.63	3.63	3.52	3.63	3.29	3.47	3.55	3.48	3.15	3.45	3.09	2.74	3.61	3.49

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries.

Table B3: Concentration Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Commitments (sector only)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria		1.29	1.17	1.27	1.29	1.15	1.26	1.21	1.25	1.24	1.19	1.24	1.23	1.13	1.46	0.99	1.07	0.82	0.88
Belgium	0.68	0.93	1.24	0.95	0.91	1.07	1.41	1.21	1.28	0.82	1.13	1.17	1.15	0.98	0.96	0.9	0.94	0.79	0.77
Czech Republic																	0.53	0.66	0.78
Denmark	1.58	1.24	0.4	1.07	0.16	0.86	0.75	0.53	1.19	1.02	1.21	1.22	0.79	0.95	1.24	1.01	0.85	0.74	0.51
Estonia																			0
Finland	1.09	0.53	0.74	1.02	1.29	0.98	1.11	1	0.99	0.81	1.09	0.96	0.94	1.23	1.16	0.94	1.4	1.12	1.26
France	1.19	0.99	1.36	0.78	0.71	0.84	0.58	1.17	1.19	1.12	0.89	0.98	0.53	0.67	0.89	1.15	1.17	1.05	0.98
Germany	1.2	1.09	0.91	1.17	1.28	1.28	1.32	1.29	1.43	1.1	1.27	1.16	1.5	1.35	1.31	1.22	1.31	1.39	1.28
Greece								0.74	0.61	1.02	1.13	1.26	1.05	1.03	0.02	0.14	0	0	
Ireland						1.23	1.11	1.17	1.21	1.23	1.42	1.32	1.4	1.44	1.19	1.16	1.12	1.39	1.39
Italy	1.1	0.89	0.56	1.22	1.12	0.93	0.73	1.27	1.54	1.17	0.78	0.8	1.4	1.27	0.87	1.2	1.31	0.99	0.99
Luxembourg							0.43	0.29	0.65	1.15	1.18	1.44	1.68	1.44	1.38	1.43	1.49	1.4	1.43
Netherlands	1.21	1.35	1.28	1.39	1.45	1.32	1.39	1.3	0.95	1.17	1.09	0.9	0.99	1.25	1.24	1.27	1.24	0.97	1.33
Poland																			0.95
Portugal		0.43	0	0.64	1.07	0.19	0.22	0.4	0.36	0.66	0.83	0.84	0.88	0.56	0.73	1.15	1.09	1	1.23
Slovak Republic																			0.5
Slovenia																1.18	0.93	0.4	0.75
Spain	0	0	1.58	1.65	1.51	1.41	1.44	1.7	1.35	1.59	1.55	1.72	1.78	1.64	1.37	1.23	1.51	1.53	1.12
Sweden	0.72	1.06	1.15	1.15	1.03	1.39	1.2	0.99	1.2	0.87	1.19	1.13	0.63	1.2	1.14	1.35	0.96	0.84	0.65
United Kingdom	1.36	0.87	1.17	1.56	1.34	1.39	1.36	1.31	1.08	1.28	1.25	1.13	1.33	1.23	1.29	1.45	1.47	1.12	1.57
EU Institutions	1.3	1.05	0.79	1.16	1.12	1.18	1.28	1.04	1.53	1.42	1.45	1.4	1.36	0.9	1.11	1.34	0.77	1.25	1.39

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries.

Table B4: Concentration Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Disbursements

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	3.29	3.29	3.26	3.36	2.69	3.44	3.23	3.19	3.32	3.33	2.94	3.29
Belgium	4.02	4.16	4.16	3.94	3.85	3.92	3.99	3.89	3.96	3.89	3.79	3.67
Czech Republic										2.42	2.49	2.55
Denmark		2.82	2.99	3.14	1.67	3.18	3.12	3.30	3.41	3.43	3.30	3.01
Estonia												0.08
Finland	2.60	2.92			2.28	2.79	2.92	2.97	3.04	3.24	3.19	2.94
France	3.98	3.97	3.96	3.80	3.37	3.80	4.17	4.08	4.20	3.77	3.86	3.87
Germany	4.19	4.81	4.86	4.82	3.60	4.88	4.71	4.66	4.54	4.22	4.38	4.22
Greece	2.25	2.52	2.95	2.71	2.17	1.62	3.07	2.27	1.22	0.00	0.00	
Ireland	3.50	3.67	3.51	3.70	3.45	3.33	3.40	3.54	3.24	3.41	3.37	3.22
Italy	3.46	3.28	3.71	2.74	3.70	4.33	4.07	3.84	4.19	4.21	4.02	3.32
Luxembourg		1.36	2.57	2.66	3.43	3.63	3.34	3.31	3.03	3.32	3.16	3.14
Netherlands	4.10	3.22	3.30	3.40	2.87	3.41	3.49	3.39	3.09	3.26	3.37	3.45
Poland												2.19
Portugal	1.75	2.02	2.00	1.98	1.53	2.02	1.85	1.97	2.35	2.34	2.30	2.46
Slovak Republic												1.08
Slovenia									1.80	1.68	0.75	0.85
Spain	4.47	4.20	4.18	4.43	4.69	4.72	5.00	3.90	4.51	4.59	4.37	3.81
Sweden	3.18	3.03	3.03	2.87	2.28	3.61	3.42	3.53	3.25	3.31	3.21	3.06
UK	3.51	3.47	3.70	3.29	2.28	3.43	3.22	3.04	2.99	3.14	3.15	3.39
EU	3.32	3.65	3.16	4.30	3.72	4.69	4.64	4.82	4.71	4.77	4.83	4.83

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries.

Table B5: Concentration Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Disbursements (recipient only)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	2.85	2.77	2.81	2.78	2.76	2.89	2.79	2.64	2.78	2.84	2.51	2.86
Belgium	3.56	3.50	3.49	3.37	3.35	3.34	3.29	3.23	3.30	3.14	3.08	3.06
Czech Republic										2.08	2.15	2.19
Denmark		2.46	2.59	2.66	2.80	2.67	2.44	2.77	2.86	2.87	2.89	2.64
Estonia											0.00	0.08
Finland	2.34	2.50			2.19	2.32	2.52	2.60	2.62	2.87	2.84	2.60
France	3.55	3.54	3.54	3.30	3.29	3.50	3.60	3.45	3.51	3.18	3.24	3.36
Germany	3.62	4.03	4.04	4.03	4.00	4.05	3.99	3.89	3.83	3.60	3.64	3.51
Greece	2.25	2.15	2.60	2.55	1.66	1.51	2.87	2.27	1.22	0.00	0.00	
Ireland	3.39	3.88	3.76	3.78	3.80	3.59	3.57	3.40	3.27	3.25	3.29	3.21
Italy	3.43	3.06	3.51	2.67	3.25	3.75	3.71	3.49	3.69	3.64	3.48	2.96
Luxembourg		1.36	2.51	2.40	2.87	2.93	2.74	2.88	2.61	2.75	2.63	2.59
Netherlands	3.42	2.75	2.89	2.90	3.03	3.00	2.93	2.94	2.79	2.71	2.62	2.74
Poland												1.75
Portugal	1.37	1.75	1.43	1.57	1.35	1.39	1.37	1.43	1.69	1.58	1.72	1.85
Slovak Republic												1.06
Slovenia									1.78	1.50	0.50	0.85
Spain	3.32	3.28	3.32	3.36	3.55	3.58	3.64	3.14	3.49	3.64	3.42	3.11
Sweden	2.82	2.81	2.81	2.54	2.94	3.17	3.05	3.12	2.91	3.00	2.77	2.63
UK	2.90	2.81	2.87	2.66	2.64	2.79	2.60	2.49	2.51	2.52	2.70	2.76
EU	3.06	3.30	2.98	3.88	4.05	4.11	4.09	4.16	4.04	4.02	4.10	4.11

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries.

Table B6: Concentration Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Disbursements (sector only)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	1.07	1.30	1.17	1.28	1.19	1.29	1.15	1.42	1.23	1.12	1.08	0.85
Belgium	1.10	1.28	1.17	1.07	1.21	1.12	1.05	1.01	1.15	1.17	1.04	0.79
Czech Republic										0.53	0.66	0.78
Denmark		1.02	1.16	1.24	1.22	1.07	1.14	1.54	1.23	1.10	1.10	1.02
Estonia												0.00
Finland	0.99	1.14			1.03	1.09	1.12	1.15	1.11	1.20	1.22	1.11
France	0.87	1.09	1.00	0.80	1.12	0.66	0.95	1.06	0.96	0.89	1.10	0.94
Germany	1.21	1.36	1.35	1.31	1.32	1.51	1.36	1.36	1.30	1.28	1.38	1.33
Greece	0.74	0.61	1.02	1.13	1.26	1.05	1.03	0.02	0.14	0.00	0.00	
Ireland	1.17	1.21	1.23	1.42	1.32	1.40	1.44	1.19	1.16	1.12	1.39	1.39
Italy	0.15	0.94	1.26	0.96	1.32	1.61	1.21	1.37	1.36	1.44	1.43	1.28
Luxembourg		0.00	1.15	1.18	1.44	1.68	1.44	1.38	1.43	1.49	1.40	1.43
Netherlands	1.28	1.40	1.23	1.28	1.23	1.07	1.27	1.30	1.34	1.18	1.13	1.18
Poland												0.95
Portugal	0.40	0.36	0.66	0.83	0.84	0.88	0.56	0.73	1.15	1.09	1.00	1.28
Slovak Republic												0.67
Slovenia									1.19	1.03	0.60	0.72
Spain	1.71	1.60	1.55	1.55	1.71	1.76	1.59	1.45	1.16	1.44	1.52	1.40
Sweden	1.19	1.17	1.21	1.28	1.22	1.23	1.29	1.29	1.26	1.16	1.13	1.24
UK	1.41	1.52	1.50	1.58	1.32	1.49	1.47	1.38	1.55	1.58	1.53	1.59
EU	1.09	1.13	1.12	1.35	1.42	1.40	1.44	1.36	1.45	1.53	1.52	1.50

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries.

Table B7: OverlapIndex^{a,1} ODA for FNS Commitments

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria		0.09	0.02	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.11	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.10
Belgium	0.09	0.18	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.14	0.10	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.10	0.15
Czech Republic																	0.01	0.11	0.03
Denmark	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.09
Estonia																			0.00
Finland	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.10	0.03	0.06	0.06
France	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.05	0.11	0.14	0.15	0.10	0.11	0.14	0.08	0.15	0.04	0.05	0.16	0.15
Germany	0.15	0.14	0.10	0.09	0.16	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.15	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.09	0.05	0.22	0.12	0.06	0.06	0.13
Greece								0.00	0.03	0.00	0.14	0.01	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Ireland						0.10	0.08	0.04	0.10	0.11	0.26	0.16	0.05	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.08	0.10	0.10
Italy	0.15	0.25	0.02	0.16	0.20	0.12	0.19	0.16	0.07	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.06	0.13
Luxembourg							0.01	0.00	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.05	0.10	0.03	0.07	0.05	0.06
Netherlands	0.11	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.03	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.16	0.16	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.11
Poland																			0.03
Portugal		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01
Slovak Republic																			0.04
Slovenia																0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01
Spain	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.15	0.13	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.06	0.11	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.09	0.09
Sweden	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.12	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.06
United Kingdom	0.23	0.02	0.10	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.17	0.20	0.12	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.03	0.07	0.08

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries.

Table B8: Overlap Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Commitments (recipient only)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria		0.09	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.06	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.12	0.02	0.19	0.17
Belgium	0.17	0.19	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.22	0.13	0.19	0.06	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.05	0.15	0.16
Czech Republic																	0.01	0.04	0.02
Denmark	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.11	0.08	0.04	0.18	0.10
Estonia																			0.00
Finland	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.07	0.10
France	0.17	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.10	0.10	0.03	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.12
Germany	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.18	0.11	0.15	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.08	0.22
Greece	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.15	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Ireland	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.19	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.12	0.05	0.11	0.10
Italy	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.07	0.14	0.12
Luxembourg							0.02	0.10	0.03	0.15	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.16	0.13	0.30	0.15	0.22	0.20
Netherlands	0.09	0.16	0.05	0.16	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.14	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.11	0.07
Poland																			0.04
Portugal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.05
Slovak Republic																			0.00
Slovenia																0.00	0.00	0.04	0.02
Spain	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.10	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.13	0.06
Sweden	0.15	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.27	0.00	0.04	0.06
United Kingdom	0.17	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.14

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries.

Table B9: Overlap Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Commitments (sector only)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria		0.49	0.44	0.53	0.55	0.54	0.50	0.43	0.70	0.63	0.45	0.64	0.67	0.47	0.47	0.72	0.80	0.74	0.69
Belgium	0.47	0.41	0.27	0.44	0.32	0.53	0.48	0.42	0.68	0.48	0.48	0.63	0.63	0.68	0.83	0.71	0.93	0.76	0.64
Czech Republic																	0.89	0.75	0.60
Denmark	0.49	0.24	0.09	0.20	0.30	0.29	0.24	0.17	0.42	0.39	0.50	0.38	0.50	0.39	0.65	0.73	0.87	0.78	0.53
Estonia																			0.41
Finland	0.54	0.28	0.08	0.45	0.50	0.31	0.32	0.20	0.56	0.54	0.45	0.44	0.59	0.39	0.61	0.81	0.54	0.89	0.76
France	0.53	0.42	0.31	0.35	0.33	0.40	0.28	0.50	0.69	0.57	0.44	0.61	0.51	0.77	0.88	0.83	0.76	0.81	0.70
Germany	0.70	0.48	0.25	0.34	0.61	0.50	0.38	0.38	0.80	0.52	0.50	0.64	0.68	0.56	0.76	0.81	0.54	0.75	0.85
Greece								0.16	0.47	0.38	0.81	0.42	0.59	0.50	0.67	0.58	0.79	0.09	
Ireland						0.51	0.37	0.28	0.70	0.58	0.82	0.68	0.78	0.65	0.81	0.86	0.71	0.75	0.71
Italy	0.73	0.81	0.11	0.68	0.80	0.72	0.79	0.57	0.76	0.51	0.40	0.57	0.70	0.71	0.91	0.88	0.58	0.79	0.68
Luxembourg							0.24	0.29	0.48	0.60	0.48	0.74	0.67	0.57	0.51	0.63	0.52	0.76	0.92
Netherlands	0.71	0.45	0.31	0.49	0.51	0.43	0.45	0.36	0.48	0.63	0.48	0.47	0.39	0.54	0.82	0.71	0.58	0.82	0.80
Poland																			0.70
Portugal	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.16	0.36	0.24	0.21	0.23	0.32	0.41	0.37	0.55	0.59	0.71	0.80	0.76	0.61	0.56	0.63
Slovak Republic																			0.59
Slovenia																0.73	0.58	0.32	0.42
Spain	0.00	0.00	0.29	0.50	0.63	0.48	0.45	0.40	0.59	0.73	0.58	0.79	0.67	0.40	0.48	0.88	0.57	0.72	0.68
Sweden	0.48	0.42	0.30	0.27	0.46	0.44	0.36	0.35	0.56	0.56	0.50	0.55	0.56	0.67	0.67	0.80	0.77	0.85	0.56
United Kingdom	0.83	0.33	0.25	0.43	0.52	0.46	0.45	0.54	0.65	0.74	0.64	0.64	0.46	0.64	0.40	0.63	0.54	0.89	0.69

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries.

Table B10: Disbursements on Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Disbursements

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	0.12	0.12	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.16
Belgium	0.13	0.14	0.20	0.14	0.09	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.17	0.17	0.16
Czech Republic										0.05	0.06	0.08
Denmark		0.09	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.12	0.17	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.15
Estonia												0.02
Finland	0.02	0.04			0.03	0.11	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.11
France	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.13	0.11	0.14	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.22	0.23	0.19
Germany	0.10	0.14	0.14	0.22	0.06	0.26	0.25	0.29	0.26	0.23	0.26	0.26
Greece	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01	
Ireland	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.22	0.16	0.14	0.20	0.18	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.19
Italy	0.01	0.09	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.19	0.22	0.17	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.17
Luxembourg		0.00	0.19	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.11	0.09	0.14	0.15	0.11	0.09
Netherlands	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.01	0.13	0.20	0.17	0.14	0.11	0.15	0.20
Poland												0.04
Portugal	0.08	0.01	0.11	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03
Slovak Republic												0.04
Slovenia									0.02	0.05	0.01	0.01
Spain	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.20	0.11	0.21	0.20	0.15	0.20	0.20	0.16	0.12
Sweden	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.12	0.15	0.15	0.13	0.13
UK	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.23	0.12	0.19	0.19	0.08	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.16

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries.

Table B11: Overlap Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Disbursements (recipient only)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	0.21	0.20	0.13	0.26	0.27	0.29	0.30	0.22	0.23	0.20	0.20	0.26
Belgium	0.23	0.31	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.34	0.35	0.44	0.33	0.32	0.30
Czech Republic										0.13	0.13	0.16
Denmark		0.17	0.12	0.16	0.29	0.26	0.28	0.31	0.39	0.36	0.38	0.24
Estonia												0.02
Finland	0.09	0.16			0.26	0.27	0.30	0.23	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.27
France	0.32	0.35	0.31	0.27	0.34	0.28	0.37	0.41	0.40	0.37	0.35	0.32
Germany	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.43	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.54	0.45	0.45	0.50	0.44
Greece	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.28	0.14	0.08	0.18	0.11	0.03	0.00	0.04	
Ireland	0.14	0.17	0.22	0.37	0.35	0.40	0.41	0.37	0.34	0.30	0.33	0.32
Italy	0.23	0.13	0.18	0.21	0.29	0.41	0.37	0.43	0.41	0.36	0.42	0.30
Luxembourg		0.09	0.27	0.16	0.27	0.26	0.21	0.22	0.25	0.23	0.26	0.22
Netherlands	0.17	0.11	0.18	0.20	0.30	0.31	0.35	0.37	0.31	0.26	0.24	0.29
Poland												0.08
Portugal	0.10	0.04	0.13	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.06
Slovak Republic												0.09
Slovenia									0.14	0.10	0.03	0.04
Spain	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.32	0.41	0.37	0.35	0.30	0.34	0.34	0.31	0.26
Sweden	0.08	0.13	0.06	0.21	0.28	0.31	0.32	0.29	0.26	0.29	0.29	0.27
UK	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.32	0.22	0.32	0.37	0.32	0.30	0.30	0.25	0.30

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on total ODA for FNS to individual recipient countries.

Table B6: Concentration Index^{a,1} ODA for FNS Disbursements (sector only)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	0.68	0.57	0.47	0.53	0.63	0.65	0.67	0.58	0.59	0.68	0.64	0.66
Belgium	0.69	0.82	0.90	0.49	0.56	0.63	0.67	0.60	0.67	0.73	0.70	0.66
Czech Republic										0.58	0.55	0.63
Denmark		0.79	0.83	0.38	0.45	0.45	0.54	0.66	0.67	0.71	0.72	0.75
Estonia												0.43
Finland	0.88	0.51			0.51	0.57	0.57	0.50	0.62	0.66	0.71	0.79
France	0.64	0.78	0.75	0.40	0.55	0.47	0.65	0.70	0.67	0.70	0.73	0.68
Germany	0.73	0.63	0.65	0.54	0.66	0.75	0.72	0.66	0.71	0.76	0.87	0.87
Greece	0.61	0.65	0.70	0.85	0.40	0.47	0.57	0.44	0.43	0.45	0.25	
Ireland	0.60	0.74	0.80	0.76	0.60	0.74	0.78	0.67	0.69	0.81	0.82	0.84
Italy	0.04	0.88	0.48	0.37	0.62	0.80	0.86	0.76	0.77	0.93	0.76	0.73
Luxembourg		0.02	0.67	0.46	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.54	0.56	0.68	0.76	0.86
Netherlands	0.87	0.71	0.85	0.47	0.52	0.52	0.69	0.68	0.70	0.62	0.69	0.78
Poland												0.74
Portugal	0.61	0.68	0.75	0.48	0.59	0.55	0.56	0.57	0.66	0.66	0.59	0.53
Slovak Republic												0.51
Slovenia									0.52	0.65	0.32	0.42
Spain	0.67	0.76	0.80	0.60	0.74	0.72	0.56	0.63	0.68	0.77	0.82	0.76
Sweden	0.84	0.63	0.71	0.62	0.60	0.69	0.76	0.63	0.72	0.74	0.70	0.78
UK	0.74	0.65	0.70	0.81	0.86	0.75	0.78	0.51	0.72	0.73	0.86	0.83

^a See text for details of calculation.¹ Based on sector-specific ODA for FNS to all recipient countries.

The FOODSECURE project in a nutshell

Title	FOODSECURE – Exploring the future of global food and nutrition security
Funding scheme	7th framework program, theme Socioeconomic sciences and the humanities
Type of project	Large-scale collaborative research project
Project Coordinator	Hans van Meijl (LEI Wageningen UR)
Scientific Coordinator	Joachim von Braun (ZEF, Center for Development Research, University of Bonn)
Duration	2012 - 2017 (60 months)

Short description

In the future, excessively high food prices may frequently reoccur, with severe impact on the poor and vulnerable. Given the long lead time of the social and technological solutions for a more stable food system, a long-term policy framework on global food and nutrition security is urgently needed.

The general objective of the FOODSECURE project is to design effective and sustainable strategies for assessing and addressing the challenges of food and nutrition security.

FOODSECURE provides a set of analytical instruments to experiment, analyse, and coordinate the effects of short and long term policies related to achieving food security.

FOODSECURE impact lies in the knowledge base to support EU policy makers and other stakeholders in the design of consistent, coherent, long-term policy strategies for improving food and nutrition security.

EU Contribution	€8 million
Research team	19 partners from 13 countries

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